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Abstract
We introduce a model of strategic environmental policy where two rms compete à la Cournot
in a third market under the presence of multiple pollutants. Two types of pollutants are in-
troduced, a local and a transboundary one. The regulator can only control local pollution as
transboundary pollution is regulated internationally. The strategic e¤ect present in the original
literature is also replicated in this setup. However, we illustrate that when transboundary pollu-
tion is regulated through the use of tradable emission permits instead of non-tradable ones then
a new strategic e¤ect appears which had not been identied thus far. In this case, local pollution
increases further and welfare is lowered. We also provide evidence from the implementation of
EU ETS over the pollution of PM10 and PM2:5:
JEL classication: F12, F18, Q58.
Keywords: Environmental regulation, multiple pollutants, (non) tradable permits, strate-
gic interactions.
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1 Introduction
There is a consensus among theorists, policymakers, and practitioners regarding the necessity to
promote cooperation among individual countries to combat climate change and, in general, any
international environmental problem in which a prisoners dilemma situation applies. In practice
the problem is complex due to the fact that concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage
co-exist. Despite the obstacles, small steps have been taken but a great deal still remains to be
done. Many countries have signed the Kyoto protocol and other regional agreements that aim to
ght transboundary pollution problems (United Nations, 1998). In December 2014 in the Lima
United Nations conference, negotiators representing over 190 countries elaborated the elements of
the new agreement, scheduled to be agreed upon in Paris in late 2015.1 The intended national
contributions will form the foundation for climate action post-2020 when the new agreement will
be launched (United Nations, 2014).
In the specic context of curbing CO2 emissions, most countries have put their faith in a com-
bination of emission taxes, quotas, and tradable emission permits. Nonetheless, the optimal mode
and level of regulation are debatable.2 Moreover, who should bear the burden of environmental
regulation is also questionable. Policymakers have expressed severe concerns regarding the loss
of competitiveness as many rms are sensitive to environmental regulation and are thus footlose.
Indeed, several European countries have been implementing carbon policies since the 1990s, and
at the same time they have granted various forms of rebates to energy-intensive rms. A specic
form of rebates is the free allocation of permits. For example, the European Commission decided
to exempt from permit auctions the carbon-intensive and trade-exposed industries (Martin et al.,
2014; Meunier et al., 2014).3
Following the prescription of cooperation many international programs have now been imple-
mented regarding the regulation of CO2. The most well-known example is the EU Emission Trading
System (EU ETS) for CO2 emissions which covers more than 11,000 power stations and manufac-
turing plants in the 28 EU member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. In total,
the EU ETS limits around 45% of the total emissions in the participating countries (European
Commission, 2013).
In reality CO2 and other transboundary pollutants co-exist with other pollutants which a¤ect
the environment locally (or they are transboundary pollutants of a shorter range). Similarly to
CO2 regulation the governments tend to establish agreements for the local pollutants. To this end,
di¤erent policy instruments have been used in various cases. An example is the 1999 Gothenburg
1Lately, even the Ponti¤ is active on the issue. As John Vidal (2014) describes in The Guardian, Decemember
27: ...popes wish to directly inuence next years crucial UN climate meeting in Paris, when countries will try to
conclude 20 years of fraught negotiations with a universal commitment to reduce emissions.
2Stern (2006) provides a general report on these issues. The interested reader may also refer to Weitzman (2007)
for a critique of the Stern Review.
3The evidence, however, on the magnitude of the e¤ect of climate policy over production or relocation decisions is
mixed. In particular, Martin et al. (2014) do not testify that the UK Climate Change Levy caused output reductions
or plant exit among treated rms. On the contrary, Wagner and Timmins (2009) and Hanna (2010), among others,
argue that rmschoices are deterred by environmental regulatory stringency.
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protocol that denes national emission ceilings for a number of pollutants. The protocol came into
force on May 17, 2005 following two main provisions. Annex I determines the critical loads and
levels and then Annex II sets emission ceilings for 2010 for four polluntants: sulphur, NOx, VOCs,
and ammonia, while it was amended in 2012 to include national emission reduction commitments
that should be achieved by 2020 and beyond (United Nations, 1999). Interestingly, a severe form of
local pollutants that adversely a¤ect human health-particulate matters (both PM10 and PM2:5)-
were not included in the initial amendments. The latter has been included in the revised version of
the protocol signed in Geneva in May 2012 and denes emission reduction commitments for PM10
and PM2:5 for 2020 and beyond, which are expressed as a percentage reduction from the 2005
emission level.
However, apart from the European air quality standards, EU individual governments are re-
sponsible for their own air quality policy and legislation. For example, the Environment Agency in
the UK regulates the release of pollutants into the atmosphere that come from large and complex
industrial processes. They also decide on the emissions generated from large-scale food processing
factories and pig and poultry rearing activities. The Environment Agency works with local au-
thories in England and Wales and their strategy sets air pollution standards in order to protect the
environment, as well as peoples health.
Our Contribution: The current paper aims to contribute in several directions. We establish
a tractable analytical model where we assume that transboundary pollution is regulated interna-
tionally, while regulators control local pollution. More specically, in a two-country, two-pollutants
framework, we assume that local pollution is regulated through the use of emission standards, while
for the transboundary pollution we examine two alternative policy instruments: non-tradable and
tradable permits. These scenarios are consistent with the EU alternative regulations schemes;
before and after the introduction of tradable permits in 2005. In this context, we aim to study
whether local regulator-governments have an incentive to set more lenient environmental regulation
in order to control local pollution so as to promote the exporting activity of polluting rms. The
second objective is to examine whether the magnitude of this strategic incentive depends on the
environmental policy instrument implemented for the regulation of the transboundary pollutant.
Our results suggest that there indeed exists a strategic e¤ect in the multiple pollutants case.
The most important nding, however, is that when transboundary pollution is regulated through
the use of tradable permits then a regulator has a stronger incentive to relax regulation regarding
local pollution compared to the case where transboundary pollution is controlled through the use
of command and control. This implies that a stronger strategic distortion exists because of the
presence of tradable permits which exacerbates the previously existing prisoners dilemma. Put
di¤erently, we identify a channel which if not considered can lead to welfare losses. In the case
where the permit price appears to be relatively high then its use may lead to a welfare improvement
in this setup.4
4A higher permit price may emerge from a possible withdrawal of permits. This was suggested by the European
Commission and it is now being implemented. We discuss this in detail in section 4.
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To support our theoretical results we then focus on several export sectors in the EU 28 countries
that have participated in the EU ETS launched in 2005 and we observe that local pollution as
expressed by concentrations of PM10 and PM2:5, which, as discussed above, has been under the
discretion of local regulators, initially increased, while both in non-export sectors and in sectors
that are not participating in the EU ETS, the corresponding concentrations have decreased over
time. To illustrate this, we provide some statistics that show the trend of the above local pollutants
during the period 1990-2012 in the EU 28, which is then compared with the trend of the CO2 in
the same period.
The exemption of PM10 and PM2:5 pollutants from the Gothenburg protocol provides us with
the opportunity to isolate the e¤ect that we are interested in. As our theoretical predictions and
the anecdotal evidence seem to converge on the fact that regulation for these local pollutants was
relaxed immediately after the imposition of the EU ETS, new policy implications arise. We caution
that when governments are concerned about the competitiveness of their exporting sectors and sign
agreements regarding international environmental problems they should not overlook the regulation
of local pollutants.
Related Literature: The environmental policy as a means to a¤ect the competitiveness of the reg-
ulated sectors has been well studied in the Strategic Environmental Policyor Ecological Dumping
literature, established, among others, by Conrad (1993), Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Rauscher
(1994), Ulph (1996), and Neary (2006). A common suggestion in the latter literature is that gov-
ernments engaging in international competition have a unilateral incentive to set the environmental
regulation below the rst-best level when their representative rms compete à la Cournot in world
commodity markets in order to enhance their prots and maximize national welfare.5 As a result
a race to the bottom occurs, which is detrimental for welfare.6
Although very informative, these models assume that there exists only a single pollutant, local
or transboundary. In reality, as previously discussed, many pollutants co-exist at the same time
and their cleaning-abatement costs are characterized by economies or diseconomies of scope. In
particular, if joint abatement creates synergies then the pollutants are considered as complements in
the abatement process, while in the opposite case they are considered as substitutes.7 The linkages
arising in the presence of multiple pollutants, especially from a theoretical point of view, have
been underinvestigated. Ambec and Coria (2013) analyze a mix of tax and permit policies under
uncertainty and determine the optimal policy depending on the substitutability or complementarity
5Empirical ndings by Levinson and Taylor (2008), Ederington et al. (2005) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002)
attest this strategic interaction.
6Hamilton and Requate (2004) argue that when vertical contracts are allowed the optimal policy corresponds to
the Pigouvian tax regardless of the mode of competition. In addition, Antoniou et al. (2013) show that the race
to the bottom described in the strategic environmental policy literature may even be reversed if the two exporting
countries are linked through a permits market.
7These potential synergies are often captured in studies as ancillarybenets from the reduction of other pollutants
(e.g., Burtraw et al., 2003; Groosman et al., 2011 and Finus and Rübbelke, 2013).
The interested reader may nd several examples of substitutability or complementarity of pollutants in studies by
Sigman (1996), Greenstone (2003), Gamper-Rabindran (2006), Ren et al. (2011), Holland (2012) and Agee et al.
(2014).
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of pollutants. Another signicant theoretical contribution is the study by Moslener and Requate
(2007) which derives the optimal abatement strategies in a dynamic multi-pollutant model. Such
dynamic considerations are, however, orthogonal to the issues we address and our model therefore
abstracts from those ones.
Our paper is a natural extension of the Strategic Environmental Policy literature under the
presence of multiple pollutants. Our ndings are in line with the current stream of the literature on
the sign of the strategic e¤ect. The added value of our results is that we illustrate how the presence
of permits trading further enforce the strategic motive and may thus lead to lower welfare.8 A
recent work by Fullerton and Karney (2014), in a completely di¤erent framework, also stresses that
the implementation of di¤erent policy instruments may yield di¤erent outcomes and highlights the
necessity of joint regulation in the presence of multiple pollutants. An interesting feature identied
in our study, missing from the existing theoretical papers, is the correlation of the abatement costs of
di¤erent pollutants not only through the presence of synergies but also through an indirect channel;
that is, the regulation of one pollutant a¤ects output and this directly a¤ects the abatement costs
of the other pollutant.9
Organization of the paper : In section 2 the theoretical model is introduced. Then, in section 3
the comparative statics of the model are presented and, in section 4, the welfare analysis follows. In
section 5 an application to the EU ETS is discussed. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.
All proofs of the corresponding lemma and propositions are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
Consider, initially, a symmetric two-country, home and foreign, two-stage game. Each country is
represented by a government and an exporting rm. When rms produce they emit two di¤erent
pollutants, a local and a global one. The global pollutant is regulated through an international
agreement which implies that the governments are not exible regarding the regulation of this
pollutant. The timing structure is as follows:
Stage 1: The governments move simultaneously and individually select regulation for the local
pollutant, while for the global one they are restricted by an international agreement.
Stage 2: The rms compete à la Cournot in the world commodity market.
Since the focus of the analysis is on strategic trade, we further assume that consumption of the
goods in the two countries is zero, thus total production by the two rms is exported to the rest
of the world (ROW). Production for the domestic rm is denoted by x, and the production cost,
without loss of generality, is normalized to zero.10 Total revenue is r(x;X), and we assume that
8 In a di¤erent setup Caplan and Emilson (2005) show that the use of permits both for a global and a local pollutant
may lead to a Pareto superior welfare outcome. Moreover, Emilson and Zhu (2009) show that in the presence of
multiple pollutants the pollution haven hypothesis is veried despite the presence of a permits market for the global
pollutant.
9Holland (2012) in a di¤erent model also denes an output e¤ect, which is unrelated to ours. Holland (2012)
introduces pollution as an input and the output e¤ect follows from the changes in the corresponding price of pollution.
On the contrary, we model pollution as a public bad.
10All choice variables and functions of the domestic (foreign) country and rm are denoted by lower- (upper-) case
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the two outputs are substitutes, rX < 0. Production emits two pollutants, zi where i = 1; 2. The
pollutant z1 denotes the local and z2 a perfectly transboundary. Both are related to production
through the following equation: zi = ix, i is a positive scalar. Let ei denote the maximum cap
of emissions of each pollutant in the home country. Both pollutants adversely a¤ect residents
in the two countries. The corresponding damage function and its properties are the following:
d(e1; e2 + E2 +
Pn
j=1 ej), where ej denotes transboundary pollution from sector j, whereas dei ,
dE2 > 0, deiei , dE2E2 > 0 and deie i , de1E2  0. These conditions simply state that the damage is
increasing and convex with respect to pollution. When the last two conditions are satised with
equality the damage of pollution is separable across the two pollutants.
Following the relevant literature (Ambec and Coria, 2013) we allow each rm to have private
abatement technology (ai) for each pollutant, which allows adherence to the binding level of regula-
tion set by the governments. Should the international agreement on the global pollution allow rms
to trade permits they can increase pollution if they purchase permits from the permits market. For
example, the home rm can increase (reduce) emissions above (below) e2, if it buys (sells) pollution
permits from (to) its rival at a given price P e, determined in the competitive permits market. The
rm may decide to sell (purchase) an amount e2 > 0 (< 0) of (over) its initially allocated permits
e2, and thus reduce (increase) its emissions by e2. Given the possibility to trade permits, abatement
for each pollutant is ai = ix  ei + (ei)  0. Note that for the local pollutant, permits trading is
not allowed. The abatement cost is as follows:
ac(ai; a i) =
2X
i=1
ci(ai) + aia i:
The total abatement cost functions consist of two components. The rst one is the sum of the direct
cost of reducing emissions by ai units for i = 1; 2. For this term we assume that aciai(ai) > 0 and
aciaiai(ai) > 0. Put di¤erently, the abatement cost is increasing and convex. The last component
of the abatement cost function captures the possible spillovers across abatement levels for the two
di¤erent pollutants. When  < 0 they are complements, while when  > 0 they are substitutes
in the cost functions. Thus, complementarity (substitutability) implies that for all abatement
levels a1 > 0 and a2 > 0; the cost of joint abatement is lower (higher) than the cost of reducing
the emissions of each pollutant separately. These synergies resemble the economies of scope in
production resulting from producers mergers. In addition, we need to assume that acxx(ai; a i)  0
which implies     c1xx()+c2xx()2  . This assumption implies that the marginal costs with respect
to output should be constant or increasing. Prots are dened as:
 = r()  ac() + P ee2. (1)
Since in the two countries there is no consumption of the good, the changes in consumer surplus
are captured exclusively by the changes in the damage function. Welfare in the home country is
letters. Since the two rms (countries) in the main case are assumed to be symmetric, we only present the explicit
variables and functions of the home rm (country).
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dened by:11
w = ()  d(). (2)
We solve the problem backwards. Each rm maximizes its prots with respect to output, the
corresponding abatement levels, and the number of permits it is willing to trade. Therefore, the
maximizing problem of the rm is the following:
max
x;ai;e2

s.t. ai = ix  ei + (ei)
, max
x;e2

The rst-order conditions for the two rms are:8>>>><>>>>:
x = rx()  acx() = 0
X = RX() ACX() = 0
e2 = P
e + @P
e
@e2
e2   ace2() = 0
E2 = P
e + @P
e
@E2
E2  ACE2() = 0
9>>>>=>>>>; . (3)
The second-order conditions are satised since xx < 0, e2e2 < 0 , 
H  xxe2e2   2xe2 > 0 and
XX < 0, E2E2 < 0 , 
F  XXE2E2  2XE2 > 0. Moreover, xX < 0 and xX < 0 ensure that
the output reaction functions are downward sloping and are a strategic substitutability of outputs.
In the set of equations given by (3) we assume that @P
e
@e2
= @P
e
@E2
= 0 which implies that the rms
act as price takers in the thick permits market. Indeed, the EU ETS scheme includes almost half
of the EUs CO2 emissions from 11,000 installations across all 28 member states.12
The equilibrium permit price, P e, is the one that clears the permits market, that is,
e2 + E2 +
nX
j=1
"j = 0; (4)
where "j stands for the sales of permits of rms belonging to di¤erent sectors in the common
permits market.
3 Comparative Statics
In this section we rst present the results regarding the strategic e¤ect in a general mode and then
introduce a linear specication in order to go through the details of some extreme cases.
11For simplicity it is assumed that permits are grandfathered to the rms so that welfare does not depend directly
on permit revenues. This is consistent with the distribution mechanism adopted in the EU ETS during the rst two
phases.
12Price taking behavior in the permits market is a widely used assumption in the literature (Sartzetakis, 1997;
Malueg and Yates, 2009; Meunier, 2011; Antoniou et al., 2014).
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3.1 General Results
We examine the decisions made in stage 2 of the game and attain the comparative statics of a
fully symmetric international duopoly. The comparative statics analysis focuses on the sign of the
so-called strategic e¤ectthat appears in eco-dumping models and leads to the prisoners dilemma.
The strategic e¤ect can be described as the e¤ect that homes environmental regulation has on the
foreign rms stage 2 equilibrium output, i.e., @X

@e1
or @X

@e2
, where stars denote stage 2 equilibrium
values. In models of standard strategic environmental policy with a unique pollutant the sign
of each derivative separately is unambiguously negative. That is, an increase in the number of
permits by one country lowers the marginal cost of abatement, and thus raises local output. The
other countrys output falls due to the reaction function of output. As in the current study we
want to focus on a new strategic motive present due to the existence of the permits market for the
transboundary pollutant, we need to distinguish between two alternative scenarios regarding the
regulation of transboundary pollution:
Scenario 1 (NT) Transboundary pollution is regulated through the allocation of a xed number of
permits to each rm.
Scenario 2 (T) Transboundary pollution is regulated through the allocation of a xed number of
permits to each rm and the allowance to trade internationally.
Both scenarios above introduce a command and control approach for regulation with the di¤er-
ence being that in the second scenario rms are more exible in the pollution they can emit since
they can exchange permits. In order to make our point clear and comparable we assume that under
both scenarios the regulator allocates the same amount of xed permits. Everything being equal
isolates the new strategic motive created by the presence of permit trading.
Since the regulators in the two countries are restricted by the international agreement regarding
transboundary pollution they only have limited degree of freedom which translates to a unique
choice variable, that is e1 and E1 respectively. The rst necessary step toward our results is to
determine of the strategic e¤ect @X

@e1
in the two di¤erent scenarios and compare its magnitude. The
following proposition summarizes this:
Proposition 1 a) Under scenario 1,

@X
@e1
NT
< 0 i¤  >  c1xx(). b) Under scenario 2,
@X
@e1
T
< 0 i¤  2 ( 1; 1).
From Proposition 1 (a) we observe that when command and control is used for regulating the
transboundary pollutant the outcome is ambiguous and depends on the degree of complementarity.
In particular, when the pollutants are substitutes in the cost functions ( > 0) or independent ( =
0) the strategic e¤ect is always negative. Relaxing regulation of the local pollutant tends to decrease
local marginal abatement costs and thus increase output. This in turn increases the abatement costs
of the global pollutant. This is not su¢ cient to invert the sign of the strategic e¤ect from negative
to positive (see  = 0). When  > 0 the reduction of the aggregate marginal abatement costs is
stronger because of the spillovers. When, however, the pollutants are complements ( < 0) then
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the strategic e¤ect is weakened for a relatively low degree of complementarity in absolute values.
In case where this value equals the slope of the marginal abatement cost of the local pollutant,
 c1xx(), the strategic e¤ect is zero. In this particular case, there is no incentive for the regulator
to distort regulation regarding the local pollutant as the lower marginal costs are then o¤set by the
spillover e¤ect. If the degree of complementarity exceeds this level then the strategic e¤ect turns
out to be positive. That is, the indirect e¤ect attributed to the spillovers may exceed the negative
direct e¤ect on local marginal abatement costs following from a laxer standard. Therefore, in the
presence of more than one pollutant it can be the case that the governments have an incentive to
tighten regulation in order to enhance competitiveness, which is not possible under the standard
eco-dumping models with a single pollutant (e.g., Barrett, 1994).
Another implication which follows from the proof for the sign of the strategic e¤ect, yet is intu-
itively straightforward, is that without spillovers, when the slope of the direct marginal abatement
cost for the transboundary pollutant (c2xx) is innite then the strategic e¤ect tends to be zero.
This describes a situation where there is no abatement technology available for the transbound-
ary pollutant. Therefore, relaxing the local emission standard cannot increase production since
production must adhere to the binding level of transboundary emissions.
Regarding the case where tradable permits are used instead of command and control, i.e.,
Proposition 1 (b), we infer that the sign of the strategic e¤ect is also ambiguous. In particular,
when the degree of complementarity or substitutability does not exceed in absolute value the
squared root of the product of the slopes of the direct marginal abatement costs of the local and
the global pollutant, i.e.,  2 ( 1; 1), where 1 =
p
c1xxc2xx; the strategic e¤ect has a negative
sign. Put di¤erently, a government has an incentive to relax environmental policy for the local
pollutant for strategic purposes as long as the spillovers are rather low in any direction. If this is
not the case then the strategic e¤ect can be zero or can even turn out to be positive. The spillovers
tend to mitigate the strategic e¤ect, as the rm responds to changes in local pollution in two ways.
First, it adjusts output in a similar way as in the non-tradable permits case and, second, decides
on the volume of permit trading. The latter is determined from the restriction that the marginal
abatement costs of the transboundary pollutant are xed at the international permits price. As
 departs from zero the volume of permit trading adjusts such that the aggregate marginal costs
increase relative to the case where  = 0.
To provide a clear comparison of the two scenarios under study, we need to compare the slopes
of the marginal abatement cost of the local and the transboundary pollutants. This comparison
leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (a) If the slope of the marginal abatement cost of the local pollutant is higher than
the slope of the marginal abatement cost of the transboundary pollutant, i.e., c1xx > c2xx; then the
sign of the strategic e¤ect

@X
@e1
i
; where i = NT; T; is as follows:
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  1   c1xx   1 0 1 +1
NT +        
T + +     +
(b) If the slope of the marginal abatement cost of the local pollutant is lower than the slope of
the marginal abatement cost of the transboundary pollutant, i.e., c1xx < c2xx; then the sign of the
strategic e¤ect is:
  1   1   c1xx 0 1 +1
NT + +      
T +       +
From Corollary 1(a) we observe that when the two pollutants are complements and the degree of
complementarity is  2 ( c1xx; 1), the strategic e¤ect is negative under emission standards and
positive under tradable permits. Put di¤erently, for a relatively high degree of complementarity the
incentive to relax regulation for strategic purposes appears only when a government implements
non-tradable permits as a means of regulation. The opposite is true in the case where the slope
of the marginal abatement cost of the local pollutant is lower than the corresponding slope of the
transboundary pollutant, and the degree of complemetarity  2 ( 1; c1xx) (Corollary 1(b)). In
this case the incentive to relax regulation for strategic purposes is present only when a government
imposes tradable permits to deal with the global pollutant. The intuition for this follows directly
from the mechanics previously presented.
Another obvious di¤erence between the two modes of regulation is that in the tradable permits
case the strategic e¤ect can be positive even in the case where the pollutants are substitutes. That
is, the domestic government relaxes local pollution and this results in lower domestic production.
When the degree of substitutability is su¢ ciently high a possible relaxation of the standard over
the local pollutant decreases the direct marginal abatement cost but this results in a proportionally
higher increase in total marginal costs, which in turn leads to a total decrease in output. This is
due to the presence of a competitive permits market which invalidates the direct e¤ect of regulation
on marginal costs through the spillovers. Another di¤erence between the two scenarios is obtained
when there is no abatement technology available for the transboundary pollutant and at the same
time no spillover e¤ects exist. Contrary to scenario 1, now, the strategic e¤ect remains negative
since the rm can always buy permits from the permits market and skate over the previously
binding levels of emissions.
Most likely, at least for intermediate values of , in both scenarios the strategic e¤ect is negative.
Therefore, even if an agreement is reached regarding the transboundary pollutant, there is an
incentive to disregard the local pollutant. The results of Proposition 1 extend and generalize the
major results of the strategic environmental policy literature under multiple pollutants. From a
welfare analysis perspective it is worth comparing the two alternative scenarios after introducing
multiple pollutants. Doing so we obtain interesting results that cannot be anticipated at rst sight.
The following proposition compares the strategic e¤ects in the two cases:
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Proposition 2 Given that the stage 2 equilibrium outputs are the same across the two scenarios
then for jj  " it follows that

@X
@e1
NT
>

@X
@e1
T
.
Proposition 2 is very important as it provides a ranking of the strategic e¤ects across the
two scenarios and this in turn is the driving force for the welfare analysis to follow. Stage 2
equilibrium outputs are set at the same level so that the two strategic e¤ects are comparable.
This is redundant for any linear demand function and quadratic abatement cost function, which
are the usual assumptions introduced in the relevant literature as the level of the strategic e¤ect
is independent from the output level. Proposition 2 implies that, for a given equilibrium, if the
government in the home country relaxes the emission standard for the local pollutant then there
is a reduction in the foreign rms output more in the case where the transboundary pollution
is regulated through a permits market rather than the use of emission standards. Therefore, the
strategic motive is higher in the rst case.
The rationale is as follows. When transboundary pollution is regulated through non-tradable
permits then a higher level of local pollution decreases the marginal abatement costs and production
tends to rise. Following this, marginal abatement costs of the global pollutant increase as the rm
must abate more and this in turn reduces the magnitude of the initial e¤ect. The component of
the abatement costs that corresponds to the global pollutant acts as an automatic stabilizer. On
the contrary, when tradable permits are implemented the increase in output following the higher
standard for local pollution does not increase the marginal abatement costs of the global pollutant
as these are xed at the international permits price.
Combining Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 we obtain an interesting implication. Since the strate-
gic e¤ect is higher in the non-tradable permits case (Proposition 2) and for  > 1 the strategic
e¤ect in the tradable permits case turns positive, then by continuity there must exist a  2 (0; 1)
for which the values of the two strategic e¤ects are equalized. For a degree of spillovers larger than
 the ranking of the strategic e¤ects reverses its order.
3.2 Robustness: The Role of  under a Linear Specication
Here, we introduce a linear specication of the model to examine in detail what happens when
the spillovers are signicant. In the linear specication case we introduce explicit functional forms.
In particular, we assume a linear inverse-demand function as P = B   b (x+X) and a quadratic
abatement cost function as ac(ai; a i) =
P2
i=1
1
2gia
2
i +aia i. Note that B is the demand intercept,
b > 0 the slope of the inverse demand and gi the slope of each direct marginal abatement cost, while
all the rest is the same as in the benchmark model. Replacing these functions in the corresponding
formulas we get the strategic e¤ects in the two scenarios as follows:
@X
@e1
NT
=   b(g1 + )
(b+ g1 + g2 + 2)(3b+ g1 + g2 + 2)
@X
@e1
T
=   bg2
 
g1g2   2

(3bg2 + g1g2   2) [(b+ g1) g2   2] (5)
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Comparing the two e¤ects in (5) we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If  2 (max f g1; g2g ; ) then

@X
@e1
NT
>

@X
@e1
T
.
Generally interpreted, Proposition 3 states that for moderate values of  the results presented
thus far are not altered. In particular, the di¤erence in the strategic e¤ects under tradable and
non-tradable permits is always negative as long as the degree of complementarity does not exceed
in absolute terms the slope of any of the two direct marginal abatement costs. When the degree
of spillovers is rather small there are two e¤ects following a laxer local standard a¤ecting the level
of the strategic e¤ect. The direct marginal abatement cost is reduced but the marginal abatement
cost of the transboundary pollutant tends to increase when standards are used while it is zero when
permits are implemented. Since in any scenario the rst e¤ect is stronger than the latter the result
is a decrease in total marginal abatement costs. Therefore, the domestic rms output tends to
increase. Contrary to that, when tradable permits are implemented, the increase in output as a
response to the relaxed policy for the domestic pollutant does not have secondary e¤ects through
the marginal abatement costs of the transboundary pollutant because these are tied down by the
permits price. In this case, no automatic stabilizers are present, which implies that the strategic
e¤ect is even more negative. Due to the fact that the indirect e¤ect tends to increase the total
marginal abatement costs in scenario 1, the strategic e¤ect is greater compared to scenario 2.
When the two pollutants are complements, or the degree of substitutability is relatively low,
the ordering of the strategic e¤ects in the two scenarios does not change. The spillover e¤ect tends
to a¤ect the di¤erence between the two strategic e¤ects because in the tradable permits case the
rm reacts to the policy change through its decision regarding permits, reducing the magnitude of
the e¤ect of the change in regulation over the overall marginal abatement costs. For intermediate
values of  the ordering of the strategic e¤ects does not change as the e¤ects described above
prevail. When the degree of substitutability, however, takes relatively high values, i.e.,  >  this
ordering is reversed. Now, if the domestic regulator relaxes regulation for the local pollutant then
foreign output decreases more under scenario 1 compared to scenario 2. In this case the regulators
incentive to relax local regulation in order to gain a market share is dampened when tradable
permits are implemented.
4 Welfare E¤ects
So far we have analyzed the sign of the strategic e¤ects in the two scenarios and their relative
magnitude. In the original eco-dumping literature the presence of the strategic e¤ect in both
exporting countries is detrimental for welfare. Both countries are involved in a prisoners dilemma
where both exporters produce too much output and emit too much pollution. Therefore, we shall
expect that the higher this e¤ect in absolute terms the higher the welfare losses.
To set this formally we introduce the welfare maximization problem of the regulator in the
home country. In order to make the results of the two scenarios comparable and abstract from any
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other e¤ects we need to assume that the level of the transboundary pollution is exactly the same
across the two scenarios.13 In any case the regulator has as a unique choice variable the level of
the local pollutant. The welfare maximization problem translates to:14
dw
de1
i
=

@
@x
@x
@e1
+
@
@e2
@e2
@e1

| {z }
=0 (FOCs)
+
@
@e1|{z}
abatement e¤ect
(MC)
+
@
@X
@X
@e1| {z }
strategic e¤ect
  @d
@e1|{z}
regulation benet
(MD)
= 0, i = NT; T .
(6)
The second-order condition is satised from concavity. Applying the envelope theorem, the terms
in the parenthesis are equal to zero. The third e¤ect corresponds to the decrease in abatement costs
when regulation is relaxed, while the next one indicates how the strategic e¤ect a¤ects prots. The
last term denotes the benets from regulation. In a context where the regulator uses environmental
policy only to deal with the externality, i.e., non-strategically (NS), the rst-order condition is
reduced to the Pigouvian rule where the marginal cost of abatement should be equal to the level of
the marginal damage,

@
@e1
NS
=

@d
@e1
NS
. When, however, the regulator acts strategically (S),
a bias in favor of laxer regulation appears due to the strategic e¤ect. As a result a government has
an incentive to increase local pollution for trade purposes, i.e., (e1)
S > (e1)
NS .
Given the previous assumption that the level of transboundary pollution is the same across the
two scenarios it follows that, ceteris paribus, in the absence of the strategic e¤ect the two scenarios
in terms of welfare are equivalent. That is, the permits price and the marginal abatement cost of
the transboundary pollutant must be equal. This marks a benchmark point in order to focus on the
strategic e¤ect and its implications for welfare. The following lemma compares the two scenarios
in terms of pollution in equilibrium:
Lemma 1 Given the equivalence of pollution across the two scenarios, when the governments act
non-strategically and Proposition 2, then in the strategic game equilibrium pollution is higher in
scenario 2 compared to scenario 1.
Lemma 1 states that the presence of a permits market for the transboundary pollutant leads
to higher pollution as a result of laxer regulation compared to the case where that pollutant is
controlled directly through command and control. This implies that equilibrium outputs will be
higher. This result is expected to hold true for any spillover as long as the ranking of the strategic
e¤ects does not change. A direct implication of Lemma 1 is the following proposition which provides
a welfare ranking across the two alternative policy scenarios:
Proposition 4 The resulting equilibrium welfare under scenario 2 is lower than the corresponding
one of scenario 1 for jj  ", i.e.,  wST <  wSNT
13On average the CO2 emissions in the EU 27 countries excluding Romania, Bulgaria, and Malta increased by 1:9%
between 2005 and 2007 (European Commission, 2008)
14Here, we implicitly assume that the government does not consider any permit price e¤ects as this is expected to
converge to zero when regulation for a single sector is relaxed.
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Figure 1: Aggregate welfare levels under tradable and non-tradable permits
Proposition 4 denes the bottom line of our results. In particular, when transboundary pollution
is regulated through the use of tradable permits we end up with welfare losses compared to the case
where each country directly regulates pollution through command and control. To understand the
driving forces of this result we introduce Figure 1.15 Aggregate welfare levels are represented for
each scenario as a function of aggregate local pollution. These are concave functions and we observe
that the cooperative solution in the tradable permits case leads to higher welfare compared to the
non-tradable permits case. Therefore, a supranational regulator would have an incentive to reduce
pollution further because the total marginal abatement cost is higher now due to the fact that the
permit price is xed at the Pigouvian level. The resulting welfare, however, is now higher because
stricter regulation tends to reduce the marginal abatement cost of the transboundary pollutant and
the rms become permit sellers.
Moving to the right from the non-strategic regulation level, in Figure 1, the ranking of aggregate
welfare levels across the two scenarios is reversed. As is shown in the proof of Proposition 4 the
critical point is to determine that at the non-strategic node the slope of the joint welfare function
is larger in absolute terms in the tradable permits case compared to the non-tradable permits one.
This combined with Lemma 1 implies that relaxing regulation decreases aggregate welfare less under
scenario 1 vis-à-vis scenario 2. That is, an increase of aggregate pollution decreases relatively more
the total marginal abatement cost in scenario 2 which leads to excess competition among rms and
lower prots. In addition to that, the rms must pay in order to buy the corresponding number of
15The point of intersection in Figure 1 denotes the non-strategic case. The permits price is such that the marginal
abatement costs are equivalent across the two scenarios in this case.
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permits. Using the resulting strategic e¤ects from Proposition 3, we infer that the non-cooperative
equilibrium under scenario 2 implies higher pollution compared to scenario 1. Therefore, aggregate
welfare is clearly lower in scenario 2 and, due to symmetry, the same holds for each countrys
welfare.
From the analysis above a ranking of the equilibrium pollution levels and the equilibrium welfare
levels follows immediately:
Corollary 2 For moderate values of ; i.e., jj < "; the ranking of equilibrium pollution and
welfare levels is: (e + E)C < (e + E)NS < (e + E)S and (w +W )C > (w +W )NS > (w +W )S
under both senarios.
The comparison of the equilibrium welfare levels shows that even though the government has
an incentive to impose lax environmental regulation for the local pollutant in order to improve
competitiveness, this instrument leads to a Pareto inferior outcome in terms of welfare. These
outcomes are a natural extension of the results provided by Ulph (1996) for the multiple pollutants
case and the intuition follows along the same lines.
Changes in the Permit Price
The analysis and the discussion of our results regarding welfare are based on the fact that the two
scenarios are equivalent in terms of welfare when the two governments act non-strategically. For
this to be true, it is implicitly assumed that the permit price adjusts accordingly. However, it is
not necessary to believe that this is indeed true in a complex world. In reality this would require
perfect information and knowledge of all markets and their interrelations such that the designers
issue the proper number of permits. Therefore, it is worth considering what the implications are
and how the results of Proposition 4 change as we agitate the permit price away from the one that
corresponds to the non-strategic case, i.e., P e 6= P eNS .
To do so we introduce Figure 2 which summarizes the results based on a linear variation of
our model. The two solid curves simply replicate the previous analysis. The two dashed curves
represent two alternative cases where the permit price is di¤erent to the one that corresponds to the
non-strategic case. In particular, for a higher permit price, i.e., P e > P eNS , aggregate welfare under
scenario 2 shifts upwards for every level of aggregate emissions. On the contrary, aggregate welfare
is lower when P e < P eNS . Though a higher permit price increases the total marginal abatement
costs of the rm, aggregate welfare is higher because the rms increase their abatement level and
protably sell permits to the other sectors, while at the same time competition is softened. Hence,
a double dividend is present for the rms, which results in higher prots. The opposite happens
when permit prices decline. That is, a lower permit price reduces total marginal abatement costs
and thus rms tend to increase production. The rms purchase permits which results in tighter
competition and lower prots.
Given these, it follows that when P e > P eNS then scenario 2 may welfare dominate scenario
1. Despite the fact that under scenario 2 regulation is too lax due to the stronger strategic e¤ect
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Figure 2: Aggregate welfare levels under tradable and non-tradable permits: Changes in permits
price
relative to scenario 1, the positive e¤ect of the higher permit price may outweigh the negative
e¤ect created by the race to the bottom. However, it must be noted that the higher the permit
price is, the stricter the level of regulation and vice-versa. On the other hand, when P e < P eNS ,
scenario 2 is clearly detrimental for welfare compared to scenario 1 since the lower permit price is
supportive of the existing negative strategic e¤ect. Given that in the EU emissions trading scheme
permit prices were very low we may conjecture that the introduction of tradable permits was indeed
welfare reducing.
5 The EU ETS and Local Pollution
In this section we aim to exploit the data provided from the survey of the European Environment
Agency (EEA) at the industry level for the EU 28 countries regarding the levels of several local
pollutants across the time period spanning within 1990-2012. Given the predictions of our theory
we expect that the introduction of a permits market would lead, ceteris paribus, to an increase in
local pollution. The introduction of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) ts the theory
presented above since during Phase I (2005-2008) the emission allowances were distributed through
grandfathering, according to the previous reported emissions of the participating industries. That
is, the target of the regulator for the CO2 emissions should be the same between the years prior to
the introduction of the EU ETS in 2005 and the following years.
The main focus of the paper is theoretical, and thus this section can be viewed only as a
natural experiment regarding the verication of the theoretical predictions of our model. Initially,
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Figure 3: Sectors participating in the EU ETS during 2008-2012.
it is useful to identify the participating sectors. In Figure 3 it can be observed that most of the
allowances were distributed to electricity producers and combustion industries, followed by iron
and steel, cement, and reneries.
From the analysis of the previous section it follows that the level of permit prices also plays a
key role in determining the optimal level of local pollution. In particular, our calculations for the
linear specication suggest that the permit price and local pollution are negatively related when
the spillovers are relatively small. In reality, however, regulation regarding local pollution rarely
adjusts, while permit prices are highly volatile and vary on a daily basis. The reader can view our
theoretical results from a long-term perspective. In Figure 4 we introduce the graph regarding the
evolution of permit prices. Two di¤erent lines are represented since allowances are traded in future
markets where promises must be fullled at di¤erent time periods. The price of permits was at
relatively high levels in 2005 while thereafter for the next two years it followed a decrease. In 2008
the price increased again to a level close to the 2005 levels.
Toward the end of that period the permit price dropped, once more opening a discussion within
the EU commission as to whether to withdraw a signicant amount of permits. As published in
the Financial Times on January 24, 2013 (see Clark et al., 2013): Connie Hedegaard, the EU
climate commissioner, said the price collapse should serve as a nal wake-up callfor both member
states and the parliament.The recent events show that something has to be done urgently, she said,
and urged support for a proposal to postpone auctions of 900m carbon permits while discussions get
under way on a more fundamental x.A temporary withdrawal was indeed approved. However,
the e¤ectiveness of this measure on permit prices remains questionable. According to our theoret-
ical results a higher permit price results in higher welfare as exporting rms coordinate on lower
production levels while simultaneously earning windfall prots from permit trading. Therefore, our
policy prescriptions sourcing from the theoretical model are fully aligned with the intentions of the
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Figure 4: Changes in the permits price over the period 2005-2011 (Source: Point Carbon)
European Commission to raise the carbon price, despite the fact that this suggestion was opposed
by the individual governments.
This section is interesting when we focus on the year 2005 where the EU ETS is introduced and
results in a switch of regimes in the regulation of CO2. At the same time Annex I of the Gothenburg
protocol was applied and this creates a unique opportunity to identify how the regulation of local
pollution responded to this switch of the regulatory regime. To relate the information relegated
above to our theory we focus on local pollution as described by the pollutants PM10 and PM2:5 by
several sectors introduced in gures 5-6. The interesting feature that these pollutants share is that
they were initially exempted from the Gothenburg protocol. This in turn implies that the regulation
of these pollutants has been under the discretion of local authorities. The top two graphs in each
gure ((a) & (b)) present the emissions generated by industries that participate in the EU ETS,
while the bottom graphs ((c) & (d)) refer to non-participants. Also, the left-hand side graphs ((a) &
(c)) show the emissions generated by industries that have signicant exporting activity, while in the
right-hand side graphs, ((b) & (d)), we observe the corresponding emissions of non-export-oriented
industries. The ve di¤erent sectors introduced here are both export-oriented and participate in the
EU ETS: Cement, Combustion: Non-ferrous metals, Combustion: Chemicals, Aluminium and Solid
fuels & other energy industries. More precisely, the exports of the EU countries as a percentage
of the world exports are 47% for the combustion of chemicals, 43% for food processing, beverages,
tobacco, 40% for aluminium, 34% for non-ferrous metals, 28% for cement, and 16% for solid fuels.16
16The data are taken from the UN Comtrade database, apart from the export percentage of the solid fuels which
was taken from the International Trade Centre. All that data refer to the exports of 2011.
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Exporting Industries Non-exporting Industries
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5: EU28 Air pollutant emissions, PM10 - Gg (1000 tons), (Logarithmic scale)
These percentages show that the above sectors have signicant exporting activity. The most pol-
luting sector that participates in the EU ETS but is not considered to be export-oriented is Public
Electricity & Heat Production. As an example of an exporting sector that does not participate
in the EU ETS, we present all the activities related to Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing. Finally, the
three non-participants and non-export-oriented sectors presented here are the Residential Sector
and the emissions from Road Transportation and Railways. In Figure 7, we place the emissions of
CO2 generated by every single sector mentioned above.
From gures 5 to 6, regarding the level of local pollution from the exporting sectors, presented
in graphs (a), we can see that the overall trend since 1990 is decreasing. Around the period when
the EU ETS was introduced, this trend changed: in most of the examples there is an increase in the
level of local pollutants which lasts until the economic turmoil of 2008. In other words, it can be
observed that the introduction of the EU ETS was followed by an inverse U-shaped trend in the level
of local pollution. The increase in pollution after the introduction of the EU ETS may have been
strengthened by the decrease in permit prices. The economic turmoil in 2008 decreased economic
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Exporting Industries Non-exporting Industries
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6: EU28 Air pollutant emissions, PM2.5 - Gg (1000 tons), (Logarithmic scale)
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Exporting Industries Non-exporting Industries
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7: EU28 Air pollutant emissions, CO2 -Tg (million tons), (Logarithmic scale)
21
activity and as a result the level of pollution decreased in most cases, which once more decreased
permit prices. The argument becomes even stronger if we observe the level of CO2 emissions
during the same period. As expected, participants in the EU ETS with an export-oriented activity
decreased their CO2 emissions after the introduction of the ETS. A slight increase in the level of
CO2 can be observed in the last couple of years of the period under study which can be explained
through the increase in permit prices. Obviously the pattern of the pollutants PM10 and PM2:5
does not follow the trend of the CO2 emissions (Figure 7) for the sectors analyzed in graphs (a) of
the above gures.
Di¤erent conclusions are derived if we explore what is happening in the level of local pollutants
generated by sectors belonging to the remaining three categories. In the case of the industries that
participate in the EU ETS, but are not export-oriented (graphs (b)), we observe that, by and large,
the introduction of the permits market did not a¤ect the generated local pollution. In general, the
introduction of the permits market does not seem to have a¤ected the volatility of pollution and
therefore in this case there is no apparent e¤ect on the regulation of local pollution. Emissions of
local pollutants generated by industries that do not participate in the EU ETS (graphs (c) and (d))
have decreased over time with the probable exception of the sector Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing:
Stationary, which can be attributed to sector-specic reasons. The same is true for the trend of
CO2 emissions.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to explore how environmental regulations could be used as an al-
ternative tool to promote exports. More specically, we use a model of strategic environmental
policy with multiple pollutants, where the two rms compete à la Cournot in a third market.
We assume the existence of two pollutants, a local and a transboundary one. The transboundary
pollutant is controlled at an international level, while the local pollutant is regulated unilaterally.
The focus question is whether the policy targeting the local pollutant could be used as a means to
promote the exports of the competing rms under the assumption that transboundary pollution is
set internationally. Our conclusion is in any case a¢ rmative.
Our ndings show that when transboundary pollution is regulated through the use of emission
permits then the regulator has a stronger incentive to relax the regulation regarding local pollution,
compared to the case where command and control is implemented for the reduction of transbound-
ary pollution. This indicates a new strategic distortion due to tradable permits that leads to welfare
losses. We also show that this result could be reversed in the case of a higher permit price. In
this context, the higher permit price may outweigh the negative e¤ect of the race to the bottom,
which in turn implies higher welfare levels. Similarly to regulation through emission permits, when
emission taxes are implemented the marginal abatement costs are xed to the given tax, and thus
we expect that all the implications presented for the emission permits scenario will also carry over
when the regulator selects the emission taxes to regulate local pollution.
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The data extracted from the survey of the European Environmental Agency at the industry
level for the EU 28 over the period 1990-2012 support our ndings. More precisely, we observe
that export-oriented sectors that participate in the EU Emission Trading System increased the
generation of local pollutants around the period of the enforcement of the trading scheme, while
this trend was followed by a gradual adjustment during the following years. This inverted U in the
pattern of local pollutants is not observed in the sectors that either do not have signicant exporting
activities or do not participate in the European permits market. Moreover, CO2 emissions remained
constant when the EU ETS was introduced and thereafter followed a decreasing pattern for the
majority of the sectors under study.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
a) In order to determine this sign of

@X
@e1
NT
we can di¤erentiate the prot maximizing
conditions of the rms with respect to outputs and solve for the comparative statics:"
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where NT = xxXX   xXXx is the determinant of the Hessian matrix and the condition for
stability implies NT > 0 (Dastidar, 2000). Note that Xx < 0 and xe1 = acxe1() = +c1xe1() =
 + c1xx() R 0: Thus, the overall sign depends on the sign of xe1 :
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:
b) Similarly to Scenario 1 we determine
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: Di¤erentiating the prot maximizing condi-
tions in (3) it follows:266664
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where T  HF  e2e2XxxXE2E2 is the determinant of the Hessian matrix. Following Bulow
et al. (1985) in order to ensure stability of the equilibrium, the Hessian matrix must be negative
denite which implies that T > 0: Moreover, the conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium in
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this setup are satised as long as acxx(ai; a i)  0 (see Meunier, 2011). We know that XxE2E2 >
0 and remains to determine the sign of xe1e2e2   e2x = 2   c1xx()c2xx(). We dene as
1 
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:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
In order to obtain and compare the sign of the strategic e¤ect under the two senarios (NT; T ),
we need to compare the di¤erent levels of the degree of compementarity derived in Proposition 1.
More specically, if  c1xx <  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Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
When  = 0 it is trivial to show that the strategic e¤ect in scenario 2 can be expressed either
by the formula in (A2) or by the formula in (A1) given that the last two rst order conditions in
(3) are introduced in the rst two prot maximizing conditions with respect to output. Given that
the numerator of dX

de1
=
Xxxe1
NT
is the same across the two scenarios, in order to illustrate that
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NT   @X@e1 T > 0 it is su¢ cient to show that T=0 < NT=0 where the sub-index  = 0
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stands for the corresponding determinants of the Hessian matrices. Therefore:
NT=0  T=0 = c2xx(X   E2) [c1xx(x  e1)  rxx()] + c2xx(x  e2)

c1xx(X   E1) + c2xx(X   E2) Rxx()

> 0)
@X
@e1
NT
>

@X
@e1
T
:
By continuity there must exist an j"j ! 0 such that

@X
@e1
NT
>

@X
@e1
T
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Taking the di¤erence of the two strategic e¤ects in (5) we get:

@X
@e1
NT
 

@X
@e1
T
=   b(g2 + )!
(b+ g1 + g2 + 2)(3b+ g1 + g2 + 2)(3bg2 + g1g2   2) [(b+ g1) g2   2] ;
where !  3b2g2   (g1g2   2)(4bg2 + g22 + 3g2 + 2 + g1(2g2 + )).
For  < 0, given that jj < g1; g2 it follows directly that ! < 0 )

@X
@e1
NT   @X@e1 T > 0.
For  > 0 the sign of ! is ambiguous. If  = 0 then ! < 0 )

@X
@e1
NT
>

@X
@e1
T
. By
continuity follows that there must exist " > 0 such that ! < 0 )

@X
@e1
NT
>

@X
@e1
T
. It
can be shown that ! > 0 for  > 0. As  = 0 ) ! > 0 and  = 1 ) ! > 0 there must
exist a  2 (0; 1) such that

@X
@e1
NT
=

@X
@e1
T
. For  >  )

@X
@e1
NT
<

@X
@e1
T
and for
 2 [0; ))

@X
@e1
NT
<

@X
@e1
T
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1
Dene as ei1 , i = T; NT the pollution level in equilibrium under each scenario. To show that
eT1 > eNT1 it is su¢ cient to show that the strategic component in (6) is larger in the rst case,
i.e.,

@
@X
@X
@e1
T
>

@
@X
@X
@e1
NT , @X@e1 T < @X@e1 NT since   @@X T =   @@X NT . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Dene as aggregate welfare the sum of welfare levels in the two countries for each scenario:
(wc)i  w +W , i = T; NT . The rst order conditions for a maximum are the following:
dwc
de1
i
=
@
@e1
+
@
@X
@X
@e1
+
@
@x
@x
@e1
  @d
@e1
= 0
e1 = E

1:
It is important to note that, by construction, (wc)T = (wc)NT in the non-strategic case. Irrespective
of the scenario @x

@e1
>
@X@e1 . Therefore, ec1 < e1 where the index stands for pollution in the aggre-
gate case. For values of pollution which are higher than ec1 it follows that
dwc
de1
< 0. To show that
in the strategic case (wc)NT > (wc)T it su¢ ces that

dwc
de1
NT
>

dwc
de1
T
for values of e1 close to
the non-strategic equilibrium. This is true i¤

@
@X
@X
@e1
+ @

@x
@x
@e1
NT
>

@
@X
@X
@e1
+ @

@x
@x
@e1
T ,
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
@X
@e1
+ @x

@e1
NT
<

@X
@e1
+ @x

@e1
T , h@X@e1 1 +  @X@x  1iNT < h@X@e1 1 +  @X@x  1iT . Given
that

1 +
 
@X
@x
 1NT
=

1 +
 
@X
@x
 1T
< 0)
h
@X
@e1

1 +
 
@X
@x
 1iNT
<
h
@X
@e1

1 +
 
@X
@x
 1iT
,

@X
@e1
NT
>

@X
@e1
T
which given Proposition 2 holds true for jj  ". Q.E.D.
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